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COMMENTS
Successive Prosecutions and the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise: The
Double Jeopardy Analysis in Garrett
v. United States
Introduction
In Garrett v. United States,I the Supreme Court reviewed a double
jeopardy challenge to a conviction under the Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise ("CCE") provision of the federal drug enforcement laws.2 The
CCE requires proof of other felony drug offenses, "predicate offenses," as
one of its elements.3 In Garrett, the defendant was tried and convicted of
a felony violation of the drug laws, and then the government introduced
evidence underlying this conviction in a separate trial on a CCE charge.4
One of the guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause 5 prevents suc-
cessive prosecutions for the "same offense." 6 The included offense rule of
double jeopardy doctrine is that two offenses are the "same offense" for
successive prosecution purposes if proof of one offense necessarily estab-
lishes the other.7 Garrett argued that the government violated his double
jeopardy right against successive prosecutions for the same offense when
it used his previous conviction as a predicate underlying a CCE.8 The
Supreme Court rejected this claim on the dubious ground that the prose-
1. 105 S. Ct. 2407 (1985). Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and White joined. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
but offered theoretically different grounds for rejecting the defendant's claim. Id. at 2420
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined. Id. at 2422 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell took no part in the
decision.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1982). See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See infra notes 56-105 and accompanying text.
7. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2411.
8. Id. at 2416. Garrett raised a second double jeopardy challenge in which he argued
that the underlying drug offenses must be considered the same as the CCE for purposes of the
separate double jeopardy prohibition on multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at
2419-20. The Court also rejected the multiple punishment plea. Id. See infra note 123.
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cution's case fell within an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause
which lies when the greater offense has not been completed at the time of
prosecution for the included offense.9 Garrett is also troubling because
the majority suggested that a lesser included offense must occur simulta-
neously with the greater offense to invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause,
and because Justice O'Connor adopted a balancing approach in which
the defendant's criminal conduct after his first prosecution is weighed
against his interest in the finality of that prosecution."1 Though each of
these three positions appears analytically unsound, each, if adopted in
future double jeopardy cases, has the potential of severely limiting a de-
fendant's protection against successive prosecution in CCE cases.
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's analysis of the suc-
cessive prosecution claim in Garrett. First, it introduces the facts and the
decision. It then reviews the legislative and judicial history of the CCE
statute, the history and policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the
concept of included offenses. It next examines and questions the three
major positions taken by the majority justices. Finally, the Comment
discusses the impact of Garrett on future successive prosecution double
jeopardy claims under the CCE statute.
I. Garrett v. United States
A. The Facts
In March of 1981, a federal grand jury in Washington returned a
four count indictment against Jonathan Garrett and three other defend-
ants for activities relating to the importation of approximately 12,000
pounds of marijuana at Neah Bay, Washington, between September 1979
and October 1980.11 After this indictment but before trial, Garrett dis-
covered that he was under investigation in Florida for conducting a Con-
tinuing Criminal Enterprise.12  His motion to consolidate the
Washington indictment with all other "charges anticipated, investigated
and currently pending" was denied on the ground that only currently
pending charges could be consolidated.13
Garrett entered a plea of guilty to one count of importation of mari-
juana.14 He was fined $15,000 and sentenced to five years in prison. The
district court dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice to the
government's right to prosecute on any other offenses Garrett may have
9. 105 S. Ct. at 2417-19.
10. Id. at 2416-17, 2420-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 2423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2410.
13. Id.
14. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960(a)(1), 960(b)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). 105
S. Ct. at 2410.
committed.
15
In July of 1981, a federal grand jury in Florida returned an eleven
count indictment against Garrett and five other defendants.16 Garrett
was charged with having conducted a CCE from January 1976 to July
1981,17 and with having committed three substantive offenses: conspir-
acy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 18 conspiracy to import
marijuana, 19 and use of a telephone to facilitate illegal drug activities.2"
At trial, the government introduced "extensive and dramatic evi-
dence"21 of Garrett's Washington importation offense, even though the
Florida indictment did not allege that offense as a predicate to the CCE
charge.22 The trial court did not instruct the jury to exclude the importa-
tion offense from its consideration of predicate offenses to the CCE
charge.2 3 Garrett was found guilty on the CCE charge, sentenced to
forty years imprisonment, and was fined $100,000.24 Because the jury
was allowed to consider evidence of Garrett's Washington offense when
deliberating on the CCE charge, the conviction may have rested on that
offense.25 On appeal, Garrett claimed that the CCE prosecution imper-
missibly placed him in jeopardy for the second time on that offense.
B. The Decision
1. Justice Rehnquist's Opinion
Justice Rehnquist examined Garrett's argument that the predicate
offenses of a CCE are lesser-included offenses in a CCE.2 6 He questioned
this position by arguing that the CCE differs from the typical included
offense setting. In the typical setting, the lesser-included and greater of-
fenses are committed simultaneously in a single course of conduct, while
in the CCE setting the offenses are committed at different times and in
different places. This difference indicated to Justice Rehnquist that the
included offense analysis had no application to the CCE setting.
2 7
15. 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
16. Id. at 2423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (1982). 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
19. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963 (1982). 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
20. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 846, and 843(b) (1982). 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
21. 105 S. Ct. at 2425 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2426.
24. 105 S. Ct. at 2411. These penalties related solely to the CCE conviction. Garrett was
also sentenced to fourteen years in prison and received a $45,000 fine on conviction for the
other charges. Id.
25. The Florida jury was specifically instructed that importation of marijuana was an
offense they could consider when deliberating on the CCE charge. Id. at 2425 n.21 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2411-15. See infra notes 123-174 and accompanying text.
27. 105 S. Ct. at 2415-17.
Summer 19861 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
788 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:785
However, Justice Rehnquist assumed for purposes of decision that
Garrett's importation offense was a lesser included offense in the CCE.
Nevertheless, he rejected the double jeopardy claim on the grounds that
an exception to included offense principles controlled. This exception
holds that prosecution for a greater offense after prosecution for a lesser-
included offense does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause if the de-
fendant could not have been prosecuted for the greater offense at the time
he was prosecuted for the lesser-included offense.28
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor also assumed that Garrett's Washington offense
was a lesser-included offense in the CCE. However, she too rejected Gar-
rett's claim by balancing the State's and the defendant's interests under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.29 Weighing the defendant's continued
criminal conduct after the first prosecution, Justice O'Connor's scale
tipped against double jeopardy protection.30
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented from both Justice Rehnquist's and Justice
O'Connor's positions. 31 He regarded ihe CCE statute as clearly creating
an included offense situation.32 Further, he perceived that the prevailing
rationales both depended on evidence which allegedly indicated the con-
tinuation of criminal activities. Justice Stevens stated bluntly that he
could discern no constitutional significance in this evidence.3 3 Rather, he
argued for application of the traditional included offense analysis which
would result in sustaining the double jeopardy claim.34
II. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Offense
A. Statutory History of the CCE
Congress enacted the CCE provision35 because it felt that federal
28. Id. at 2417-19.
29. Id. at 2420-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 176-224 and accompanying
text.
30. 105 S. Ct. at 2422 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 2422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Asserting that the concept of included offenses is applicable to complex statutory of-
fenses, Justice Stevens stated that it "clearly" applied to the CCE statute. Id. at 2424.
33. Id. at 2426.
34. Id. at 2422-26.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982). The CCE statute provides:
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which
may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and to the
forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2); except that if any person engages in such activ-
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drug enforcement laws had been, "for the most part, ineffective in halting
the increased upsurge of drug abuse throughout our United States."
'3 6
The CCE offense was intended to reach "the organized crime offender,
... the professional criminal' 37 rather than "the casual drug user and
experimenter. ' 38 The statute identified and punished the leaders of crim-
inal drug enterprises.
Congress considered two conflicting methods to achieve this goal.
The first, which was rejected, was a "recidivist approach. ' 39  This
method was intended to create "special penalties ... for these special
criminals."' The jury would consider "only evidence concerning the ba-
sic crime which has been charged."41 A postconviction presentencing
procedure would be created to identify those persons who had coordi-
ity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have become final,
he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years
and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $200,000, and
to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2)!
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States-
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights of
any kind affording a source of influence over, such enterprise.
(b) "Continuing criminal enterprise" defined
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter
or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a super-
visory position, or any other position of management, and
(B)from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
(c) Suspension of sentence and probation prohibited
In the case of any sentence imposed under this section, imposition or execution
of such sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be granted, and section
4202 of title 18 and the Act of July 15, 1932 (D.C. Code, sees. 24-203-24-207), shall
not apply.
(d) Jurisdiction of courts
The district courts of the United States (including courts in the territories or
possessions of the United States having jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion) shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to
take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds,
in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this
section, as they shall deem proper.
36. 116 CoNG. REC. 33630 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Weicker).
37. Id. (remarks of Rep. Pofi).
38. Id. at 33631 (remarks of Rep. Weicker).
39. This approach was embodied in the original bill introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2413.
40. 116 CONG. REC. 33630 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
41. Id.
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nated criminal drug enterprises.42 The judge could enhance the con-
victed defendant's sentence by five to twenty-five years, based on an
evaluation submitted by the government. This method raised due pro-
cess concerns, because the defendant would not know what evidence was
offered to the judge in the sentencing phase.
4 3
The second method, which was adopted by Congress, was an "of-
fense approach."'  It defined a new and separate offense. The govern-
ment -would have to establish all the elements of the CCE at trial. The
"offerise method" made prior violations of the drug laws elements of the
CCE, rather than regarding them as evidence to be evaluated under the
"recidivist method." This method was hailed in Congress as consistent
with the "traditional American Criminal process,"45 which requires the
government to prove at trial every element of an offense.
In its present form the CCE offense is comprised of two tiers of
elements. The first tier requires a series of felony violations of the drug
laws by the defendant.46 The second tier requires: (1) that the defendant
undertook the first tier violations with five or more other persons; (2)
that he supervised the other persons; and (3) that he acquired "substan-
tial income or resources" from those violations. 7 These second tier ele-
ments identify the drug enterprise organizer.
B. Judicial History of the CCE Offense
As the congressional history had foreshadowed,48 defendants
charged with a CCE raised due process "void for vagueness" challenges
to the CCE statute, particularly to its use of the words "continuing" and
"series of offenses." They argued that the CCE statute did not give ade-
quate notice of the conduct it prohibited.4 9 These challenges, however,
42. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2414. The factors listed in the second tier of the current statute
would have been used to show the need for enhanced punishment of particular defendants. An
evaluation of the defendant based on these factors would have been presented to the judge
prior to sentencing.
43. 116 CONG. REC. 33631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). Criticizing the "recidivist
approach," Rep. Eckhardt stated: "I think it is intellectually fraudulent to draw a distinction
between postsentencing procedure and the conviction of a separate crime." Id.
44. This approach was embodied in an amendment proposed by Rep. Dingell. Garrett,
105 S. Ct. at 2414.
45. 116 CONG. REC. 33631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(1) (1982). The violations must be drug related offenses. See, eg.,
United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981) (it was error to instruct jury that
interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity could be a predicate offense).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1982).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
49. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
957 (1985); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sper-
ling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1974); United
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were summarily rejected by the lower courts.5 0 The word "continuing"
was held sufficiently precise because it indicated a "definite period of
time."51 The term "series of offenses" was held to require at least three
violations, based on the common understanding that "series" means
three or more.5 2 Moreover, the defendants' arguments that the statute
did not provide sufficient notice of what constituted illegal activity were
rejected, because a CCE involves a comprehensive plan to commit other
felonies which defendants clearly know are wrongful.53
Although the lower federal courts rejected void for vagueness chal-
lenges, their opinions reveal a certain flexibility accorded proof of a CCE.
The language of the statute, read strictly, requires proof of a CCE to be
based on underlying offenses, but in practice there is often an attenuated
relationship between proof of the CCE and proof of its predicate offenses.
For example, in United States v. Barnes54 the court observed:
Proof that [defendant] rented two expensive apartments in New
Jersey, masquerading in one as Hoby Darling and in the other as
Wallace Rice, gave rise to a reasonable inference that he was enti-
tled to exercise certain prerogatives of authority. Evidence that he
was attended by bodyguards was likewise illuminating; ordinary
narcotic dealers are not so carefully shielded. The jury could also
conclude that narcotic underlings do not drive around with
$132,000 in cash in the trunk of their car.55
States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Del. 1976); United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp.
1351 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974).
Other judicial developments beyond the scope of this Comment involve the parole and
forfeiture provisions. For an eighth amendment challenge to the parole provision, see United
States v. Lozaw, 427 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D.
Del. 1976). For challenges to the forfeiture provision, see United States v. Raimondo, 721
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 133 (1984) (provision gave adequate notice of
forfeiture); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980) (property bought with
enterprise's profits was subject to forfeiture provision); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (forfeiture provision is in personam, not in rem).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Del. 1976) (five day period
satisfied "continuing" language of statute).
52. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979);
United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. United
States, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977).
53. See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974) (conduct is only that which violator knows is wrongful and contrary to law).
54. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 157. See also United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1357 (1lth Cir.), reh'g
denied, 749 F.2d 733 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 957 (1985) (defendant
oversaw purchase of boats and property and selected "off loading" sites); United States v.
Dickey, 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1984) (defendant spent large sums of money on personal items
and offered a large bribe to a Coast Guard officer, indicating that he had a sizeable stake in the
enterprise).
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This evidence did not establish any predicate offenses. However, intro-
duction of this evidence is consistent with the underlying policy of the
CCE to imprison the coordinators of drug enterprises and thereby dis-
able the enterprises. Therefore, although the statute requires proof of
predicate offenses, it appears from Barnes that other evidence which re-
lates only tangentially to the predicate offenses can be used to prove a
CCE.
III. The Double Jeopardy Clause
A. Purposes and Scope of the Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." 6 The double jeopardy principle is "one of the
oldest ideas found in western civilization"57 and by the sixteenth century
was embodied in common law pleas.5 The Double Jeopardy Clause em-
bodies three principal guarantees: protection from reprosecution follow-
ing conviction, protection from reprosecution following acquittal, and
protection against multiple punishments.59
The twin purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause are to guarantee
the finality of judgments and to guard against prosecutorial overreach-
ing.6 As Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause was held applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Ben-
ton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in which the Court had held that
federal double jeopardy protection standards were only applicable to the states in cases
presenting a "hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it." Palko, 302
U.S. at 328.
57. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). This opinion de-
scribes the Greek, Roman, English, and American Colonial double jeopardy sources. The
oldest reference appears to be a statement by Demosthenes in 355 B.C. United States v. Jen-
kins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
58. These were autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, autrefoits attaint, and pardon. 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335-36 (Sharswood ed. 1873).
But see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978) (stating that the historical purposes of
double jeopardy "are necessarily general in nature, and their application has come to abound
in often subtle distinctions which cannot by any means all be traced to the original three
common-law pleas ... ").
59. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). There are two distinct settings
encompassed by these principles: (1) multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in a
single trial; and (2) successive prosecutions for the same offense.
60. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the defendant from having to
"run the gantlet [sic]" a second time); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (double
jeopardy allows the defendant to conclude his confrontation with society in one proceeding).
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attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty.6 '
The root policy of double jeopardy is fairness to the defendant. Even
though society's interest in punishing offenses is great, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause permits the government to prosecute a criminal defendant
only once for a single offense.
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a second prosecution by a
different sovereign." Nor is the double jeopardy protection violated
when a defendant's conviction is set aside on appeal and a retrial is or-
dered by the appellate court.63 Double jeopardy will bar retrial once the
defendant is acquitted." When trial ends in a mistrial or is significantly
interrupted,65 double jeopardy limits the situations in which a defendant
may be retried. 6 Double jeopardy also prevents the prosecution from
61. Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
62. For a discussion of dual sovereignty and double jeopardy, see generally Note, Double
Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1982);
Note, Emerging Standards in Supreme Court Double Jeopardy Analysis, 32 VAND. L. Rv.
609, 621-26 (1979).
63. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). For a discussion of double jeopardy issues
when the government appeals a conviction for the purposes of increasing sentence, see Mulvi-
hill, What is Double Jeopardy?: No Clear Answer in United States v. Di Francesco, 1981 DaT.
C.L. REv. 1147 (1981). It has also been suggested that retrial after successful appeal of a
conviction serves the defendant's interests because appellate courts are less likely to reverse a
conviction if this would result in freeing the defendant. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
466 (1964).
64. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (Double Jeopardy
Clause prevented government appeal of an order granting the defendant an acquittal following
a deadlocked jury). The "acquittal" finality policy is so strong that it is not outweighed by
society's interests even when "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous founda-
tion." Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
65. For example, when the trial ends in a hung jury, the judge dies, a juror is disqualified,
or war closes the courts. See generally, Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising
From The Same Transaction, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259, 287 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Double Jeopardy].
66. In the mistrial setting the defendant is deprived of his "valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). In Wade, the
Court held that the defendant's trial may be discontinued if circumstances "manifest a neces-
sity" for so doing. Id. at 690. In this situation the defendant's valued right is balanced against
society's interests: "What has been said is enough to show that a defendant's right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Id. at 689. See also United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (manifest necessity requires a "scrupulous exercise of judicial
discretion" to determine whether justice would be served by a continuation of the trial); Illi-
nois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1972) (over the defendant's objection the judge declared a
mistrial based on a defective indictment and retrial for the same offense on a valid indictment
was not barred).
Summer 1986]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
simply dismissing juries until it believes conviction will be obtained.
Though the wording and policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause are
fairly simple, double jeopardy law is complex and confusing.68 Commen-
tators and courts alike have failed to develop and apply a consistent
double jeopardy theory.69  One troubling issue is the meaning of the
words "same offense."' 7° A narrow interpretation is that only the offense
charged in the first trial is proscribed from prosecution in a second pro-
ceeding. A broad interpretation of the words is the "single transaction"
theory: any two offenses, no matter how dissimilar, are considered the
same offense if they occur during one criminal transaction. 71 The
Supreme Court has adopted a moderate position, rejecting the single
transaction theory,72 but recognizing that two offenses defined by statute
67. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (double jeopardy protection at-
taches when the jury is sworn); Serfas v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (in non-jury trials
jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn); see also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 34
(1978) ("it became firmly established by the end of the 19th century that a defendant could be
put in jeopardy even in a prosecution that did not culminate in a conviction or an acquittal.").
But see Justice Powell's dissent in Crist in which he argues that this doctrine was not intended
by the founding fathers, but was judicially integrated "without articulated thought" into
double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 47 (Powell, J., dissenting). Double jeopardy does not attach in
a pretrial proceeding in which there is no risk of conviction, such as preliminary examination.
Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 485 F.2d
1143 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
68. See Comley, Double Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J., 674, 675 (1926) (describing double jeop-
ardy as a "quaint relic of medieval jargon"); Note, Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN.
L. REV. 22 (1940) ("The riddle of double jeopardy stands out today as one of the most com-
monly recognized yet most commonly misunderstood maxims in the law."); Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 702 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (separate principles in multiple
punishment cases have been "tied together.., in what may prove to be a true Gordian knot.");
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 80 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the Supreme
Court is trying "to create order and understanding out of the confusion of... decisions on the
Double Jeopardy Clause.").
69. See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Cr.
REv. 81; McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1983).
70. Justice Rehnquist has described the words "same offense" as "deceptively simple in
appearance but virtually kaleidoscopic in application." Whalen, 445 U.S. at 700 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
71. For presentation of this theory, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution,
except in most limited cirumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that
grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."); see also Note, The
Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 967-69 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar]; Note, Double Jeopardy, supra
note 65, at 259.
72. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2418 ("We have steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transac-
tion' view of the Double Jeopardy Clause."). The main objection to the single transaction
theory is that "transaction" is a malleable term, the content of which cannot be defined pre-
cisely. However, the same transaction test has been adopted in several jurisdictions and enjoys
wide support among commentators. See Note, Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar, supra note
71, at 968 n.36.
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may sometimes be regarded as the same.73
B. The Concept of Lesser-Included Offenses
The concept of lesser-included offenses appears to have originated as
an amelioration of rigid common law rules of pleading. In The King v.
Vandercomb and Abbott,74 a prosecution for a larceny offense was barred
because the formal charges mistakenly listed the larceny as the second of
two offenses, when it had actually occurred first. To allow prosecution,
the Vandercomb court created a new rule: any second offense could be
prosecuted after an acquittal on the first offense, unless proof of the first
offense (the "greater" offense) would also establish the second offense
(the "lesser included" offense).75
The concept of a lesser-included offense answers the double jeopardy
question of whether two offenses are the same offense. Lesser-included
and greater offenses are considered the same offense for purposes of the
prohibition against multiple punishment, because punishment for the
lesser-included offense is an alternative to punishment for the greater of-
fense.7 6 Lesser-included and greater offenses are also considered the
same offense for purposes of the prohibition against successive prosecu-
tions: the possibility of punishment on the lesser-included offense at the
trial for the greater offense precludes a second jeopardy on the lesser
offense.77
In Blockburger v. United States,78 the Supreme Court developed a
test to distinguish between included and separate offenses. The defend-
ant made one drug sale which violated two distinct statutory prohibi-
tions: selling a drug which was not in its original stamped package and
selling a drug without a buyer's written order.79 The defendant argued
that the two offenses arose out of one act and were thus the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes. The Court rejected this argument and
held that if each offense requires proof of a fact which the other offense
73. See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
74. 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.C.R. 1796).
75. Id. at 461.
76. The included offense concept is codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which state: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the
offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or of an offense necessar-
ily included therein if the attempt is an offense." FED. RULES CRIM. P. 31(c).
77. The possibility of conviction on a lesser-included offense is enhanced by practical con-
siderations. See, ag., United States v. Keeble, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973) (when the jury is
convinced that a defendant is guilty of some offense it is likely to resolve doubt in favor of
conviction).
78. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger involved a multiple punishment double jeopardy
claim, despite the fact that in formulating the test the Court cited Gavieres v. United States,
220 U.S. 338 (1911) which involved a successive prosecution double jeopardy claim. Block-
burger, 284 U.S. at 304.
79. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
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does not, the two offenses are not the same.80 Two offenses are the same
offense when proof of one offense establishes a second offense, thereby
revealing a greater and a lesser-included offense."'
Although the Blockburger test 2 was applied to multiple punish-
ment8 3 and successive prosecution 4 double jeopardy claims, these were
subsequently regarded as involving distinct issues.8  In the context of
multiple punishments for the same offense, the Blockburger test as a rule
of constitutional law came under attack. 6 The Double Jeopardy Clause
has now been construed to pose no restraint on Congress' power to define
and prescribe the measure of punishment for offenses.8 7 Under currently
accepted analysis, 88 if Congress intends to punish a lesser-included of-
fense and a greater offense, it can. This view indicates that, although
Blockburger offers a presumption that two offenses are the same, this pre-
sumption can be overcome by a showing that Congress intended to pun-
80. Id. at 304.
81. Id.
82. The Blockburger test is also known as the "same evidence" test. Three theoretical
formulations of this test have been identified: (1) the same-required-evidence test, which fo-
cuses on the abstract statutory proof required in each case; (2) the same-alleged-evidence test,
which focuses on the indictments in each case; and (3) the same-actual-evidence test, which
focuses on the actual evidence at each trial. Note, Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar, supra note
71 at 965 n. 23. The same-required-evidence test is the true Blockburger test, while the same-
alleged-evidence test appears to have fallen into "deserved desuetude," and the same-actual-
evidence test was never seriously advocated. Id.
83. For a discussion of the multiple punishment setting, see generally Thomas, Multiple
Punishment for the Same Offense: The Analysis after Missouri v. Hunter or Don Quixote, the
Sargasso Sea, and the Gordian Knot, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. (1984); McKay, supra note 55; Com-
ment, Cumulative Sentences for One Criminal Transaction Under the Double Jeopardy Clause:
Whalen v. United States, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 819 (1981).
84. For a discussion of the successive prosecution context, see generally Note, Double
Jeopardy, supra note 65; Note, Double Jeopardy: The Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions, 54
CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 549 (1977).
85. Courts do not always appreciate the difference between the multiple punishment and
successive prosecution settings. The two situations are often presented as species of the same
problem: "If two offenses are the same under this test for purposes of barring [multiple pun-
ishments] at a single trial, they necessarily will be the same for purposes of barring successive
prosecutions." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
86. See generally, Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Twice in Jeopardy].
87. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2412. "Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single
criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does
not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same of-
fense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165. Justice Rehnquist has even stated that the Double
Jeopardy Clause should "play no role whatsoever in deciding whether cumulative punishments
may be imposed under different statutes at a single criminal proceeding." Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 705 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see McKay, supra note 69, at
21 n.128 (the emerging view that the Double Jeopardy Clause places no limitations on the
legislative branch has "shallow root, even from a historical perspective.").
88. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). ,445 U.S. 684 (1980).
ish both the lesser-included and the greater offense. 9 Therefore, the
controlling question in the multiple punishment setting is Congressional
intent,9" and Blockburger becomes merely a "useful canon of statutory
construction" 91 or an aid in interpreting legislative intent.92 The Block-
burger presumption no longer controls multiple punishment double jeop-
ardy claims.93
C. Successive Prosecutions For the Same Offense
In the context of successive prosecutions the Blockburger test ap-
pears to have retained its vitality. In Brown v. Ohio,94 the defendant ar-
gued that he could not be prosecuted for auto theft because of his
previous conviction for the lesser-included offense of joyriding.95 Apply-
ing Blockburger, the Court accepted the Ohio Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of auto theft as "joyriding with the intent to permanently deprive
the owner of possession." 96 Therefore, joyriding did not require proof of
a fact in addition to proof of auto theft. Because the Blockburger test
89. This was firmly established in Whlalen. The Whalen approach was reaffirmed in Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (Blockburger is the starting point in double
jeopardy analysis, but it does not control when legislative intent is clear).
There are two implications of the Court's reduction of Blockburger to a mere tool of
inquiry. First, a court may find that the legislature intended to punish both offenses, notwith-
standing Blockburger's indication that two offenses are the same. Second, a court may find
that the legislature did not intend to punish both offenses, notwithstanding Blockburgers indi-
cation that two offenses are not the same. See, eg., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6
(1977) (Blockburger indicated separate offenses but the Court found that Congress intended
that an enhanced penalty for robbery with a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1984) should
merge with an enhanced penalty for any felony committed with a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (1984)).
90. If an inquiry into legislative intent does not reveal a clear answer, then double jeop-
ardy protection should probably be granted in accordance with the policy of resolving "doubts
in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
91. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2412.
92. Id.
93. A second double jeopardy test based on notions of collateral estoppel may prevent
successive prosecutions even given separate offenses. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970),
the Supreme Court applied collateral estoppel principles to double jeopardy theory. In Ashe,
six victims had been robbed as a group. The government was barred from prosecuting the
defendant for the robberies of five victims because he had already been prosecuted and acquit-
ted of the robbery of one victim. The Brown Court explained the rule: "Even if two offenses
are sufficiently different to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecu-
tions will be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitiga-
tion of factual issues already resolved by the first." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 n.6.
94. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Brown, the Court's double jeopardy analysis hinged on the
Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of Ohio law.
95. Id. at 162-64.
96. The Court stated that "the greater offense is... by definition the 'same' for purposes
of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it." Id. at 168. The Court also observed
that the sequence of prosecution for greater and lesser-included offenses is "immaterial." Id.
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revealed the presence of greater and lesser-included offenses, the Court
accepted the defendant's plea and held that his constitutional fights were
violated when he was placed in jeopardy on the auto theft charge.97
In applying the Blockburger test, courts compare the statutory ele-
ments of the offenses at issue to see if one is included in the other.98
Blockburger has been called the "same evidence" test, which refers only
to the same required evidence in statutory terms, not the same actual
evidence presented at trial.99 This "statutory" approach, however, some-
times produces an insufficient distinction. For example, a felony may be
used to establish the requisite intent to prove murder, yet examination of
the statutory language alone does not reveal that a felony is included in
the murder. Thus, strict adherence to the "statutory" approach would
not prevent the use of evidence, previously introduced to prove a felony,
in a murder prosecution.
A second line of inquiry has been suggested to meet the inadequacies
of the "statutory" test. In Illinois v. Vitale,"° the Court reaffirmed the
"statutory" test but in dicta pointed the way to a supplemental approach:
examination of the actual evidence produced at both trials. The defend-
ant in Vitale was convicted of the offense of failing to reduce his automo-
bile's speed and was later prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter. '
The Supreme Court was uncertain whether failing to reduce speed was a
lesser-included offense in the manslaughter offense." 2 Writing for the
97. Id. at 169-70. For the view that even the clear adoption of Blockburger still provides
"minimal protection against multiple trials," see Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 65, at 279.
For the proposition that cases like Whalen and Albernaz, which deal with the multiple punish-
ment setting, do not undermine Brown, see Westen & Drubel, supra note 69, at 121 n.188 ("It
is important to distinguish here between the constitutional standards for multiple punishment
and the distinct standards for multiple prosecution. Although the Blockburger test operates as
nothing more than a rebuttable presumption for purposes of multiple punishment, it may have
a restricted and more rigid application in the context of multiple prosecution.").
The dual implications of Blockburger were described by Justice Rehnquist: "The meaning
of ["same" offense] may vary from context to context, so that two charges considered the same
offense so as to preclude [successive prosecutions] need not be considered the same offense so
as to bar separate punishments for each charge at a single proceeding." Whalen, 445 U.S. 685,
700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart held the contrary opinion that "[n]o
matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative pun-
ishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not .. "
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 345 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Marshall has stated: "I do not
believe that the phrase 'the same offence' should be interpreted to mean one thing for purposes
of the prohibition against [successive] prosecutions and something else for purposes of the
prohibition against multiple punishment." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Blockburger required comparison of the "distinct statutory provisions." Blockburger,
284 U.S. at 304.
99. See supra note 82.
100. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
101. Id. at 412-13.
102. Id. at 412, 419.
majority, Justice White observed that the defendant would have a "sub-
stantial" double jeopardy claim if the government attempted to prove
that failure to reduce speed was the reckless act required to establish the
manslaughter offense.103 Though this method of examining the actual
evidence at trial has received criticism,"° it does provide a means for
distinguishing included offense situations from separate offenses when
the statutory test proves inadequate. 105
IV. The Court's Rejection of Garrett's Successive Prosecution
Claim
A. Pre-Garrett Analysis Regarding CCE and Predicate Offenses
Soon after the enactment of the CCE statute courts had to decide
the question of whether the CCE offense presented an included offense
situation." 6 This question implicated both the multiple punishment and
successive prosecution prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause. If
the predicate offenses were lesser-included offenses within the CCE, then
103. Id. at 420. Justice Stevens characterized this possibility as "dispositive" rather than
merely substantial. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It was clear from the Court's reasoning
that this "same-actual-evidence" approach is properly applied only where the evidence estab-
lishes one entire offense and is used subsequently to establish one element of another offense.
Justice White derived the test by analogy to Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (prose-
cution for robbery with a firearm barred by earlier prosecution for felony murder based on the
robbery). Mere overlapping evidence will raise no double jeopardy issue if the "two indict-
ments be perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in fact."
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (quoting Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 381
(1906)(emphasis added)). The approach in Vitale is not a revival of direct application of the
same-alleged-evidence test or the same-actual-evidence test, supra note 82. Rather, it is a use
of these approaches to supplement the same-required-evidence test when the latter proves in-
adequate to the complexities of the crimes. As one commentator has pointed out, the "same
evidence" test is made difficult by the uncertainty as to exactly what evidence will be
presented. See Note, The Impact of Expanded Rules for Determining What Constitutes the
"Same Offense" for Double Jeopardy Purposes: Illinois v. Vitale, 1980 B.Y.U.L. REv. 948
(1980).
104. See Illinois v. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d 440,415 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 948 (1981).
In dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger criticized the Illinois Supreme
Court's finding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second prosecution where the State
intended to use the same factual basis which led to the first conviction (crossing over the center
line) as the basis for the second conviction (manslaughter).
105. For a fascinating example of the interplay between statutory elements and evidence,
see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978). The defendant was prosecuted for the fed-
eral crime of conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of state law and was acquit-
ted on allegations that he ran a horse-betting business. Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, rejected the government's contention that it might later prosecute the defendant on a
numbers business charge, pointing out that there was but one business proscribed by statute,
notwithstanding the possibility of many types of gambling in this business. Id. at 70-73.
106. See discussion of Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977) and its progeny, infra
notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
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they were arguably the "same offense" as the CCE for double jeopardy
purposes.
In Jeffers v. United States, 10 7 the Court addressed this included of-
fense question. In the multiple punishment context the Court concluded
that the predicate offense of conspiracy should be considered the "same
offense" as a CCE, because the two offenses posed many of the same
dangers, and Congress probably did not intend to punish both. 108 Thus,
the defendant's sentences for conspiracy and for a CCE could not both
stand. In the successive prosecution setting, the Court assumed for pur-
poses of decision that conspiracy was a lesser-included offense in a
CCE.' °9 Under this untested assumption, a defendant who had been
tried for conspiracy could not subsequently be tried for a CCE if conspir-
acy was used as a predicate offense, and vice versa.
110
Although the multiple punishment double jeopardy question is
presented with every CCE prosecution, successive prosecution situations
are rare. After Jeffers only two cases dealt with successive prosecution
double jeopardy challenges. In United States v. Lurz,I" the defendant
was convicted of a conspiracy to violate the drug laws. Evidence under-
lying this conviction was later introduced in a CCE trial. The Fourth
Circuit ruled that the conspiracy evidence did not violate the defendant's
double jeopardy rights because it was limited to proving the second tier
elements of the CCE. I 2 The jury was not permitted to consider the con-
spiracy as one of the three predicate offenses underlying the CCE. How-
ever, Lurz implied that the defendant's double jeopardy rights would
have been violated if the evidence had been used to establish a predicate
offense. 113
In United States v. Middleton,'14 the CCE count against the defend-
ant was dismissed at trial. This was the equivalent of an acquittal."'
The government then sought to prosecute the defendant for an importa-
tion offense, proof of which had been introduced in the CCE trial. The
First Circuit barred prosecution for the importation offense, explaining
that it was a lesser-included offense in the CCE.116 The Court stated that
a "defendant convicted or acquitted of a crime which includes several
107. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
108. Id. at 156-58.
109. Id. at 149-50.
110. Id.
111. 666 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982).
112. Id. at 77.
113. "The government concedes, as it must, that Section 846 is a lesser included offense of
Section 848. The government also recognizes the well-settled principle that the double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits trial of a defendant on a greater offense after he has been convicted of a
lesser included offense." Lurz, 666 F.2d at 75 n.10.
114. 673 F.2d 31 (lst Cir. 1982).
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id. at 33-34.
essential elements, as [a CCE] does, may not be tried subsequently for a
lesser-included offense."1 17 Thus, both Lurz and Middleton assumed that
a CCE's predicate offenses are lesser-included offenses and are therefore
the same as the CCE for successive prosecution purposes.
As Lurz indicated, evidence of a prior offense could be introduced in
a CCE prosecution under a limiting jury instruction which restricted its
use to proving the second tier elements of the CCE.118 This approach did
not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause because previously tried offenses
were not used as first tier predicate offenses on which the jury could base
a CCE conviction.' 19
B. Garrett Under Blockburger and the Pre-Garrett Analysis
Garrett argued that his importation offense was a lesser-included
offense in the CCE, and thus these two offenses were the same offense for
purposes of the prohibition against successive prosecutions. Under
Blockburger,12 ° an examination of the statutory language shows that the
predicate offenses are necessarily established on proof of a CCE. Exami-
nation of the evidence presented at the two trials also leads to this result
- the evidence of Garrett's Washington offense was not introduced for a
limited purpose.121 Therefore, because the jury may have used the
Washington offense as a predicate to establish a CCE,122 it would appear
that Garrett was twice tried for the same offense.
117. Id. at 33.
118. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
119. See, eg., Lurz, 666 F.2d at 77 ("The fact that prior convictions comprise one element
of an offense does not offend the double jeopardy clause, as long as the prior convictions are
used for [a] limited purpose... to prove [the second tier elements] and not [a predicate].");
Middleton, 673 F.2d at 33-34 (no double jeopardy issue would arise "if a defendant were
charged with possession of a controlled substance subsequent to an acquittal under [a CCE], as
long as evidence of possession had not been introduced at the earlier trial.").
120. It can probably be argued that the Blockburger test deserves a higher degree of defer-
ence in the successive prosecution setting than in the multiple punishment setting. This fol-
lows from Justice Rehnquist's own observation that the words "same offense" may have
different meanings in the two contexts. See supra note 97. Punishing a defendant for both a
greater and a lesser-included offense following a single prosecution is entirely different from
trying him for a greater offense and then trying him for a lesser-included offense. The former
situation simply does not implicate the policy of protecting a defendant from expending time,
energy and money, enduring the stigma of accusation, and risking his liberty in a second trial.
Thus, whether or not the legislature has power to punish two crimes separately does not neces-
sarily answer the objection that the Double Jeopardy Clause will not tolerate successive prose-
cutions for those crimes.
121. "There is no need to reach the question whether the Neah Bay evidence may have
been admissible for a limited purpose because no instructions regarding a limited use were
given." Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2426, n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Of course, the jury may not have regarded the importation offense as a predicate of-
fense, but this is unclear. However, Justice Stevens points out that "the fact that the govern-
ment might have proven a CCE by relying on felonies A, B, C, and D, or perhaps B, C, and
D,-would not prevent it from relying just on A, B, and C." Id. at 2425 n.20.
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C. Justice Rehnquist's Rejection of Included Offense Principles in the
Successive Prosecution Setting
Writing for four justices, 123 Justice Rehnquist called into question
whether Garrett's importation offense should be regarded as a lesser-in-
cluded offense in a CCE. He contrasted Garrett's pattern of criminal
activity with the auto theft and joyriding of the defendant in Brown v.
Ohio,124 concentrating on the simultaneous occurrence or non-occur-
rence of the offenses. Brown functioned for Justice Rehnquist as a para-
digm of included offense situations. By distinguishing Brown from
Garrett he concluded that the included offense doctrine could be properly
applied only in Brown.
121
The conduct of the defendant in Brown was fairly simple in time and
place. Brown stole a car and was arrested. Even though he possessed the
car for several days and drove it from one city to another before the
arrest, the conduct constituted a "single crime."' 26 By contrast, Gar-
rett's activity was clearly "multi-layered conduct, both as to time and to
place .... 27 According to his indictments, Garrett had violated fed-
eral drug laws in Florida, Louisiana, and Washington. 28 Presumably,
he had interstate and international contacts. His Florida indictment al-
leged criminal activities over the span of five and one half years. 29
For Justice Rehnquist, then, the significant difference between
Brown and Garrett was that Brown involved a single criminal course of
conduct while Garrett involved several instances of conduct which were
isolated from each other in time and place.' 3 ' The idea of a "single
course of conduct" is alien to a CCE setting:
123. Justice O'Connor concurred, forming a five-justice majority. She too was "willing to
assume, arguendo, that the 1981 conviction for importation of marijuana is a lesser included
offense [in the CCE]." Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2421 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In rejecting
Garrett's multiple punishment claim, Justice Rehnquist conducted an extensive inquiry into
legislative intent. Id. at 2411-15. This inquiry demonstrated that Congress intended to punish
the predicate offenses and the CCE separately. Id. This was sufficient to rebut the Block-
burger presumption that predicates are the same offense as a CCE. Justice Rehnquist distin-
guished Jeffers (see supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text) on the basis that Garrett did
not present a conspiracy conviction as a predicate. He concluded that punishment for impor-
tation and punishment for a CCE were clearly mandated by legislative intent, and, therefore,
did not constitute multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at 2419. It is unclear what
effect this holding in Garrett has on Jeffers' contrary holding regarding conspiracy and a CCE.
124. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
125. 105 S. Ct. at 2415-17.
126. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.
127. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2417.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2416.
130. Justice Rehnquist observed: "[Garrett's] various boat-load smuggling operations in
Louisiana, for example, obviously involved incidents of conduct wholly separate from his
'mother boat' operations in Washington." Id. at 2417.
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Whenever it was during the five-and-one-half-year period alleged
in the indictment that Garrett committed the first of the three
predicate offenses required to form the basis for a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise prosecution, it could not then have been said with
any certainty that he would necessarily go ahead and commit the
other violations required to render him liable on a continuing crim-
inal enterprise charge. 3 '
In Garrett Justice Rehnquist observed that "[e]very minute that Nathan-
iel Brown drove or possessed the stolen automobile he was simultane-
ously committing both the lesser-included misdemeanor and the greater
felony, but the same simply is not true of Garrett." '132 The same is not
true of Garrett's offenses because one offense alone does not satisfy all the
elements of the CCE.1
33
Justice Rehnquist regarded simultaneous commissions of greater
and lesser-included offenses as a distinguishing factor between the same
offense and separate offenses. In Justice Rehnquist's view, "included"
only referred to offenses comprised in a single criminal episode.13 4 This
reflected the view that the "doctrine of included offenses is applicable
only when the same act is relied upon for more than one conviction." 
1 35
Where there are separate acts, Justice Rehnquist concluded, there is no
proper application of the included offense doctrine.
1 36
This view was also endorsed by Justice Blackmun, dissenting in
Brown. He argued that joyriding and auto theft were separate acts and
therefore should be regarded as separate offenses. 137 Justice Blackmun




134. See generally United States v. McCue, 160 F. Supp. 595 (D. Conn. 1958) (income tax
evasion and failure to supply information); Dotye v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 206 (Ky.
1956) (attempted abortion and abortion); People v. Perkins, 147 Cal. App. 2d 793, 305 P.2d
932 (1957) (contributing to the delinquency of a minor and child molestation).
135. People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 600, 184 P.2d 512, 518 (1947) ("Although the offense
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is necessarily included in [statutory rape and
lewd and lascivious conduct,] defendant could be convicted of all three offenses if separate acts
served as the basis of each count."). See also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 277 (1981)
("Placing a defendant in jeopardy for one act is no bar to prosecuting him for a separate and
distinct act, even though the other act is so closely connected in point of time that it is impossi-
ble to separate the evidence relating to either on the first trial.").
136. 105 S. Ct. at 2417.
137. Justice Blackmun wrote:
This Court, I fear, gives undeserved emphasis, ante, at 163-164 to the Ohio Court of
Appeals' passing observation that the Ohio misdemeanor of joyriding is an element
of the Ohio felony of auto theft. That observation was merely a preliminary state-
ment, indicating that the theft and any simultaneous unlawful operation were one
and the same. But the Ohio Court of Appeals then went on flatly to hold that such
simultaneity was not present here.
Brown, 432 U.S. at 172 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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fenses could be isolated in time. 38 However, the Brown majority rejected
this view, stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause was "not such a frag-
ile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple ex-
pedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial
units."
1 39
Justice Rehnquist's position, therefore, was a resurrection of the ar-
gument interred in Brown. Justice Rehnquist viewed the Garrett facts
and the CCE crime as presenting a situation which is the complete oppo-
site of Brown. Indeed, the contrast between the pattern of criminal con-
duct in each case was so striking that Garrett demanded rejection of the
included offense paradigm concededly applicable in Brown."4
Justice Rehnquist accorded simultaneity exalted status as an ele-
ment of included offenses. He argued that included offenses are present
only when one offense necessarily includes another and where the of-
fenses are committed simultaneously. 141 Simultaneity is thus regarded as
indispensable to included offense situations.142
Justice Rehnquist's injection of simultaneity into the included of-
fense equation, however, finds meager support in the theory of included
offenses. Though simultaneity is present in included offenses involving
simple crimes,14 3 there is no reason why it is essential to the concept. 1"
Included offense theory prior to Garrett focused on jeopardy: whether
proof of one offense was sufficient to convict a defendant of a second
offense. Under this approach, the CCE is no different from other in-
cluded offense situations. A jury may convict on the three predicate of-
fenses and acquit on a CCE charge. It can also convict on the CCE
charge. Jeopardy on the CCE charge necessarily implies jeopardy on a
predicate offense. The presence of simultaneity does not affect a defend-
ant's jeopardy for the CCE and its predicate offenses. 145
Furthermore, applying a simultaneity requirement to a complex
crime is questionable. The CCE offense, a single offense, is not commit-
ted by simultaneous acts. It is committed by a series of separate acts
which are interpreted as the indicia of a unified plan, even though the
acts are unrelated in time and place. The CCE is a single course of con-
duct. Applying a rule of simultaneity to so complex an offense derides
the substance and spirit of the statute.
138. Id. at 171-72.
139. Id. at 169.
140. 105 S. Ct. at 2417.
141. Id. at 2416-17.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., offenses listed supra at note 134.
144. Jeffers itself sanctioned the application of included offense analysis to the CCE, a
complex crime. 432 U.S. at 151-54.
145. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Yet even assuming that simultaneity is necessary for included of-
fense situations, simultaneity of a kind is present in the CCE setting.
Though a CCE's predicate offenses may bear no relation to each other in
time and place, each predicate offense shares the same relationship with
the CCE as every other predicate offense. To distinguish one predicate
from another and to view the Washington events as "wholly separate"
'146
from the activities in the southern United States is thus profoundly mis-
directed. Justice Rehnquist should have examined the presence or ab-
sence of simultaneity in the relationship between a CCE and its group of
predicates. Here a kind of simultaneity does exist. A CCE's predicates
are necessarily committed in the time period comprising the actions that
constitute the CCE. To maintain otherwise is to undermine the use of
the predicate offenses in establishing a CCE.147
Thus, Justice Rehnquist refused to apply included offense principles
to the CCE statute. This was based on the assumption that simultaneity
of commissions is essential to the concept of included offenses. However,
this assumption is not necessarily sound. The possibility of two jeopar-
dies on the lesser offense, regardless of whether the crimes are simple or
complex, appears to be the crucial situation which gave rise to the in-
cluded offense rule.
141
D. The Exception to the Included Offense Regarding Successive
Prosecutions
1. Diaz v. United States
The majority in Garrett assumed that Garrett's Washington impor-
tation offense was a lesser-included offense in his CCE,149 and held that
the exception to included offense principles established in Diaz v. United
States 150 controlled the decision.1 ' The Diaz exception allows prosecu-
tion for a greater offense after prosecution for the lesser-included offense,
if the greater offense was not completed at the time the lesser-included
offense was prosecuted. 2
In Diaz the defendant was convicted for assault and battery. The
victim later died from the effects of the assault, and the defendant was
charged with homicide. Arguing that the assault and battery charge was
a lesser-included offense in the homicide charge, the defendant claimed
that the assault and battery conviction barred the homicide
146. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2417.
147. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's opinion has a schizoid appearance. The Washington impor-
tation offense was not part of the CCE for included offense purposes, but it was part of the
CCE for conviction purposes. 105 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
148. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
149. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2418.
150. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
151. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2419.
152. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 446.
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prosecution. 153
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and estab-
lished a new rule: a double jeopardy plea would not be sustained if the
prosecution for the lesser offense had already begun before the greater
offense was completed. 154 The Court emphasized that at the time of the
assault and battery prosecution it was impossible to prosecute on the
homicide charge. 5 Blind adherence to the included offense principle
would have had the anomalous result of preventing prosecution for an
offense which had yet to occur. A second prosecution would preserve
society's right to prosecute and punish the second offense. Thus, the
Diaz exception was created to allow prosecution for the greater offense in
spite of the general double jeopardy rule regarding included offenses.
The sine qua non of the Diaz exception was society's inability to
prosecute the second offense at the time it prosecuted the first.
156
Though the Diaz exception has invariably been invoked in cases with
subsequently occurring facts,15 7 dicta in Brown v. Ohio extended the ap-
plication of the exception to cases where facts necessary to establish the
greater offense have not been discovered at the time the lesser offense is
prosecuted.1 58 Although the Brown dicta has not been applied, the idea
is consistent with Diaz: it is impossible to bring a second charge without
knowledge of its requisite facts.
The Diaz exception is consistent with the underlying double jeop-
ardy policy concerns. A defendant's assurance of finality as to the lesser
charge is preserved, because the lesser offense is not regarded as included
in the second prosecution.1 59 In addition, the Diaz exception limits the
potential for prosecutorial harassment or overreaching, because the pros-
ecution must bring the second charge if possible. 6 ° Thus, the Diaz ex-
ception accommodates society's interest in punishing crimes without
violating the policy concerns of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 449.
155. The Diaz Court stated: "At the time of the trial for the [assault and battery] the death
had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide committed. Then, and not before,
was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense." Id.
156. The Court in Diaz observed that the death of the victim was the event that made a
homicide prosecution possible: "Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in
jeopardy for that offense." Id. at 448-49.
157. Prior to Garrett, the Diaz exception also seems to have been applied only to situations
in which the subsequently occurring fact was the death of the victim. See FELLMAN, THE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 380 (1976) ("It has been explained that no murder had oc-
curred at the time of the first trial, and that the state does not have to postpone the trial for the
assault indefinitely to wait and see whether the victim will die.").
158. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n.7.
159. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 449.
160. "[hf the victim is dead at the time of the assault charge, a later charge of homicide
should be barred." FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 95 (1969) (interpreting similar doctrine
in Canadian law).
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2. Justice Rehnquist's Application of Diaz
Justice Rehnquist drew an analogy between the lesser-included and
greater offenses in Diaz and Garrett. Diaz's assault and battery charge
corresponded to Garrett's importation offense, and Diaz's homicide cor-
responded to the CCE. Justice Rehnquist then demonstrated that Gar-
rett's CCE, like Diaz's homicide, was not completed at the time Garrett
was prosecuted for the importation offense.
161
The cornerstone of this analogy was the jury's finding that Garrett
continued his criminal enterprise after the Washington conviction. This
finding was supported by certain evidence presented at trial. While out
on bail awaiting sentence, Garrett was arrested for a traffic violation. He
made some incriminating statements to the police, saying that he was a
smuggler and that he owned a boat and had recently purchased a
truck.162 He was also carrying $6,253 in cash, thirty dollars of which
was in quarters. 163 The utility to a drug enterprise of a boat, truck,
quarters for long-distance phone calls, and large amounts of capital sup-
ported the jury's finding that Garrett continued to operate a drug enter-
prise after his importation conviction.'"
Using these facts, Justice Rehnquist supported his analogy. Diaz
permits prosecution for a greater offense if it is completed after prosecu-
tion for a lesser included offense. Garrett completed his CCE after his
importation conviction. Therefore, prosecution for Garrett's CCE, using
evidence of the importation offense as a predicate offense, was not
barred. 165
By applying Diaz to the facts in Garrett, Justice Rehnquist assumed
that the principles relating to an offense that has a clear point of comple-
tion (the death of the victim) also apply to an offense which continues
even after it is statutorily complete. This assumption is dubious. The
victim's death in Diaz was significant because it completed the offense of
homicide. Thus, a correct analogy of a CCE to Diaz would be as follows:
When a defendant commits one or two drug offenses, the government
would be unable to prosecute for a CCE; a third offense, however, satis-
fies the series of offenses requirement of the CCE statute, and the govern-
ment could prosecute for a CCE. Diaz would permit the prosecution to
use evidence of the first two offenses in proving a CCE in this situation,
even though the government may have already prosecuted the first two
offenses. This, however, was not the situation in Garrett. Garrett's CCE
was complete, in the sense that the statutory elements were satisfied,
161. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
162. Id. at 2418.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2419.
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before his Washington importation prosecution began.
1 66
3. The Diaz Exception After Garrett
Justice Rehnquist's application of Diaz to Garrett subtly changed
the Diaz exception. In Diaz the facts occurring subsequent to Diaz's
prosecution for assault and battery were necessary to bring the second
prosecution for homicide. Justice Rehnquist, however, viewed this "ne-
cessity" as indicating what is necessary to obtain conviction. 167 He
stated: "We cannot tell without considerable sifting of the evidence and
speculating as to what juries might do whether the Government could in
March 1981 have successfully.., prosecuted Garrett for a different con-
tinuing criminal enterprise-one ending in March 1981.' '161 The signifi-
cant factor for Justice Rehnquist was "successful prosecution." The Diaz
inquiry was thus changed from "could the government have prose-
cuted?" to "could the government have obtained conviction?"'16 9
By defining necessity in terms of the quantum of evidence needed to
convict, Justice Rehnquist misinterpreted Diaz. In Diaz, "necessity"
clearly meant that which is necessary to proceed with the second prose-
cution.170 Diaz stressed the prosecution's inability to proceed on the sec-
ond prosecution for homicide. Had the government been able to
prosecute the homicide offense at the time it prosecuted for assault and
battery, double jeopardy would have barred successive prosecutions.
171
It was the inability to prosecute the second offense, not the inability to
convict, that permitted the government to place the defendant in jeop-
ardy on the greater offense after his trial on the lesser-included offense.
Even assuming that evidence discovered subsequent to the Washing-
ton prosecution invoked the Diaz exception in Garrett, Justice Rehn-
quist's application of Diaz is undercut by the fact that the subsequently
discovered evidence was not discovered by the prosecution until after the
commencement of the CCE prosecution in Florida. 172 When the govern-
ment filed the CCE indictment, it could not have relied on an allegation
that Garrett continued his CCE activities in order to introduce evidence
166. See id. at 2425 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2418.
168. Id.
169. While the former question presented a standard which was easily applied, the latter
question is imponderable and allows no second guessing of the government's choice.
170. See supra note 155. The homicide charge was "not capable ofjudicial determination."
Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, 26 (1869). See also Wyatt v. Municipal Court, 242
Cal. App. 2d 845, 51 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1966) (when the new fact constitutes a new crime not
susceptible of adjudication in the first proceeding, the determination in the first proceeding is
not a bar to a prosecution for the newly developed crime). But see Note, Double Jeopardy,
1982 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 493, 511 n.143 (subsequently discovered evidence is "significant
new evidence," which tends to support Justice Rehnquist's view).
171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
172. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2416-18.
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of the Washington importation offense, because the facts supporting this
allegation were yet to be discovered.173 Garrett's CCE prosecution could
not have been brought as a result of the government's discovery of a
completed or continuing offense by Garrett. 174
Thus, Justice Rehnquist fit the Garrett facts into a subtly altered
Diaz exception. In Justice Rehnquist's view, Garrett's continued crimi-
nal activities after his first prosecution indicated that the greater CCE
offense was not complete when he was convicted on the lesser-included
importation charge. The flaw in this application is that Diaz speaks to
the possibility of bringing a prosecution for the greater offense, not to the
probability of obtaining conviction on the greater offense.
E. Justice O'Connor's Balancing Approach in Garrett
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, balanced the compet-
ing policy interests involved in a CCE prosecution.175 Rather than ap-
plying the Diaz exception,1 76 Justice O'Connor weighed the interests of
defendants in finality and protection from prosecutorial overreaching
against "the compelling public interest in punishing crimes. ' ' 17 Signifi-
cantly, Justice O'Connor also included the defendant's criminal conduct
in this weighing process.1 78 According to Justice O'Connor, this balanc-
ing of competing interests comported with the "fundamental purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause."1 79 By concluding that society's interests
outweighed the defendant's, she found that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not offended in Garrett.
180
To some extent policy interests are always balanced in double jeop-
ardy analysis." 1 The Double Jeopardy Clause does not impose an abso-
173. The Florida indictment was filed on July 16, 1981. Garrett's incriminating statements
were made a week later. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Surely, if the prosecution had evidence of a continuing offense discovered in the period
between the Washington conviction and the Florida indictment, the evidence would have been
presented at trial.
175. 105 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Justice O'Connor found "merit" to the position that the Diaz exception should be
limited to "circumstances where the facts necessary to the greater offense occur or are discov-
ered after the first prosecution." Id. at 2421 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
178. 105 S. Ct. 2422 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2420.
180. Id. at 2422.
181. Justice O'Connor states that the result in Garrett "comports ... with the method of
analysis used in our more recent decisions." Id. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also
Westen & Drubel, supra note 69, at 103 ("In each case one must balance the defendant's
interest in finality against 'the public interest in assuring that each defendant shall be subject to
a just judgment on the merits .......") (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978)).
Westen and Drubel list the interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause in "ascending
degrees of importance" as: "(1) an interest in finality which may be overcome relatively easily;
(2) an interest in avoiding double punishment which comes armed with a presumption in the
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lute prohibition on two trials for the same offense.182 Justice O'Connor
stated that the "finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in [prose-
cuting offenses]."
1 83
On the defendant's side of the balance is the policy of finality:184 a
defendant should be able to conclude his "confrontation with society" in
one proceeding.185 Finality is prominent in mistrials, where the defend-
ant is subjected to a second trial after an abortive first trial. Finality
protects the defendant from the "embarassment, expense and ordeal and
... continuing state of anxiety and insecurity" '186 occasioned by succes-
sive prosecutions. Finality is promoted by limiting society to one trial for
one offense.
187
The finality policy also protects defendants from prosecutorial over-
reaching or harassment.' 88 Typically, overreaching means attempts to
obtain conviction in successive prosecutions, 89 or attempts by the prose-
cution to "hone its case" in successive prosecutions. 190 Overreaching has
two elements: misconduct by the prosecutor and hardship to the defend-
ant.191 Overreaching may include attempts by the prosecution to create
a mistrial.
192
On society's side of the balance is the interest in vindicating its crim-
defendant's favor; and (3) an interest in nullification-viz, an interest in allowing the system to
acquit against the evidence-which is absolute." Westen & Drubel, supra note 69, at 84.
182. In the mistrial setting "[t]he double jeopardy clause will not bar reprosecution when a
mistrial is declared without a defendant's consent, providing that either the circumstances
reveal a 'manifest necessity' for the declaration or that the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated." Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137, 158 (1977).
183. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. Finality applies to judgment and non-judgment situations: "Although the pri-
mary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to protect the integrity of a final judgment,
this Court has also developed a body of law guarding the separate but related interest of a
defendant in avoiding [successive] prosecutions even where no final determination of guilt or
innocence has been made." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (citation omitted).
185. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
186. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). A second trial "increases the finan-
cial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an
unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an innocent defend-
ant may be convicted." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
187. "[S]ociety's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents
for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws."
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
188. "Harassment is not a synonym for inconvenience. All repeated prosecutions distress
defendants." Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 86, at 286.
189. See Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
190. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
191. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 86, at 286.
192. Id. at 286-88.
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inal laws.193 Thus, there is a great interest in bringing criminals to jus-
tice, as well as the related interest of maintaining and perfecting the guilt
adjudication process. 194
The new factor which Justice O'Connor injected into the balance
was Garrett's criminal conduct.195 Citing Jeffers v. United States'96 and
Ohio v. Johnson,197 Justice O'Connor stated that a defendant, by pursu-
ing criminal conduct, may tip the successive prosecution double jeopardy
balance against protection.198
In Jeffers, the defendant was charged in one proceeding with con-
spiracy to distribute narcotics and in another proceeding with con-
ducting a CCE. 199 The government moved to consolidate the charges in
one trial.2" The defendant resisted and was tried separately for the two
offenses.20 1 When the defendant argued that he had been tried twice on
the same offense, the Supreme Court used his opposition to the consoli-
dation to defeat the double jeopardy claim: the defendant forfeited any
objection to the second trial because he had, by resisting consolidation,
required that the government try him in two separate proceedings.202
In Johnson, the defendant was charged with a lesser-included and a
greater offense and entered a guilty plea on the lesser offense.203 He then
resisted prosecution on the greater offense.2" The Johnson Court held
that the defendant's guilty plea could not be used "as a sword to prevent
the State from completing its prosecution" for the greater offense.20 5
Justice O'Connor acknowledged Garrett's interest in finality,2 6 and
noted the absence of prosecutorial overreaching. 20 7 She also noted soci-
ety's interest in prosecuting CCE offenses. Presumably, the balance was
equal at this point.20 8 Justice O'Connor then weighed Garrett's conduct
in continuing his CCE activities, and the balance tipped in the govern-
ment's favor: "Where a defendant continues unlawful conduct after the
193. The defendant's interest must "accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and
convicting those who violate the law." Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. Double jeopardy itself is a societal interest. By specifically including this protection in
the Bill of Rights, the founding fathers obviously recognized it as such. Balancing the defend-
ant's interests against society's interests effaces this realization.
195. 105 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. 432 U.S. 137 (1977). See also supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
197. 467 U.S. 493 (1984), reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 20 (1984).
198. 105 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 140-42.
200. Id. at 142.
201. Id. at 142-44.
202. Id. at 152-54.
203. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 496.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 502.
206. 105 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, . concurring).
207. Id. at 2422.
208. But see infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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time the Government prosecutes him for a predicate offense, I do not
think he can later contend that the Government is foreclosed from using
that offense in another prosecution to prove the continuing violation of
[the CCEI."209 As in Justice Rehnquist's application of Diaz,21° it was
Garrett's conduct after his Washington conviction that defeated his
double jeopardy plea.
Justice O'Connor's use of Garrett's conduct differed significantly
from Justice Rehnquist's use. For Justice Rehnquist, Garrett's conduct
established further evidence of the CCE, which invoked the Diaz excep-
tion.21' In contrast, Justice O'Connor used Garrett's conduct as a
weighty factor in the double jeopardy balance.212
Justice O'Connor believed that Garrett's conduct, which continued
his "confrontation with society, ' 213 should operate as a waiver of double
jeopardy protection. She wrote: "As the Court noted in another context,
'the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppres-
sion, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary
choice.'"214 Thus, Justice O'Connor saw a CCE defendant as making a
conscious choice in the CCE setting: to continue criminal activities and
waive double jeopardy protection, or to desist from criminal activities
and claim double jeopardy protection.215
From a policy perspective, Justice O'Connor's position, that there is
no double jeopardy protection while a defendant continues to commit the
greater offense, is persuasive. It is based on notions of fundamental fair-
ness. If a defendant truly wishes to conclude his confrontation with soci-
ety in one proceeding, then he must stop committing the greater offense
after trial on the lesser-included offense: if Garrett wanted relief from a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, then he should have stopped
his continuing criminal activity. Under Justice O'Connor's balancing ap-
209. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2422 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist cryptically
intimated agreement with this opinion: "One who insists that the music stop and the piper be
paid at a particular point must at least have stopped dancing himself before he may seek such
an accounting." Id. at 2417.
210. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
213. 105 S. Ct. at 2422 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor appeared to interpret
the phrase "confrontation with society" as including a defendant's criminal violations rather
than merely society's prosecution of him. Id.
214. Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978)).
215. If a defendant does not continue criminal activity, this will not necessarily mean he
will succeed on a double jeopardy claim. Justice O'Connor carefully leaves this issue open:
"Moreover, I note that we do not decide in this case whether a defendant would have a valid
double jeopardy claim if the Government failed in a later prosecution to allege and to present
evidence of a continuing violation of [a CCE] after an earlier conviction for a predicate of-
fense." Id. at 2422.
proach, a defendant must cease committing the greater offense before he
may claim finality on the lesser-included offense.
Justice O'Connor's use of waiver also finds some support in other
double jeopardy settings.2" 6 The elements of knowledge, voluntariness,
and intent, applicable to waivers of other constitutional rights,21 7 do not
seem to apply in double jeopardy cases, where waiver is "vague and mal-
leable." '18 Double jeopardy waiver has been inferred from the defend-
ant's actions,219 and this supports Justice O'Connor's inference of waiver
from Garrett's actions.220
Jeffers and Johnson, however, lend only weak support to Justice
O'Connor's position. Those cases involved procedural maneuvering by
the defendants at trial, and protecting the integrity of the trial process by
preventing a defendant from building error into the system.221 In Jeffers
and Johnson, the defendants were prevented from creating a double jeop-
ardy issue. Both defendants knew of the two charges against them and
made a conscious effort to split the government's case.222 In contrast,
Garrett, faced with only one charge, made no attempt to split the govern-
ment's case or create a double jeopardy issue. By moving to consolidate
all charges against him, Garrett even attempted to facilitate prosecution
and avoid a double jeopardy issue.223 Garrett in no sense created the
double jeopardy issue at trial. Thus, the procedural machinations in Jef-
fers and Johnson are distinguishable from Garrett's conduct, and this dif-
ference should caution against extrapolating waiver principles from
Jeffers and Johnson to Garrett.224
216. For a discussion of waiver in the double jeopardy setting, see Note, Criminal Law-
Waiver of Double Jeopardy Right: The Impact of Jeffers v. United States, 14 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 842 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Waiver of Double Jeopardy].
217. See id. at 848 ("The Supreme Court has often disposed of cases based on double jeop-
ardy waiver while ignoring standards of voluntariness, knowledge, and intent.").
218. Id. at 846-48.
219. See, e.g., Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902
(1965).
220. However, Justice O'Connor's application of waiver is novel. Waiver has only been
applied to (1) a defendant's appeal of his conviction, (2) a defendant's request for a mistrial, (3)
situations where the defendant was solely responsible for separate trials, and (4) situations
where the defendant requested separate trials. See Note, Waiver of Double Jeopardy, supra
note 216, at 848-50. One commentator has argued that Jeffers relies more on notions of estop-
pel than waiver. Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 65, at 269.
221. This is a policy which has significance independent of the specific double jeopardy
issue pregented. The integrity of the trial process must be maintained vis-a-vis all attempts to
pervert it, notwithstanding the involvement of specific constitutional rights.
222. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
223. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2410.
224. Jeffers and Johnson can further be distinguished from Garrett because the defendants
were solely responsible for separate trials. See Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 65, at 269
("It is unclear, however, what burden defendant bears if the government is partially responsi-
ble for the two trials.").
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Even assuming that waiver principles apply to a CCE, Justice
O'Connor's approach suffers from the fact that double jeopardy protec-
tion is made to depend on a determination of guilt which is made only
after a defendant's second trial. For example, if Garrett had been acquit-
ted on the CCE charge, it would then be clear that his activities after the
Washington conviction would not be "wrongful." Garrett's postconvic-
tion conduct would not have weighed against him, and he would have
had a valid double jeopardy claim. It is ironic that the merits of a double
jeopardy claim can only be determined after a second prosecution which
itself raises a double jeopardy issue. Thus, however sound from a policy
perspective Justice O'Connor's balancing test is, it puts trial courts in an
impossible position: faced with a double jeopardy plea under facts simi-
lar to Garrett, the trial judge must base his ruling on an assessment of the
defendant's guilt made outside of a trial proceeding. Although Justice
O'Connor's balance is sound in theory, it is untenable in practice because
the "conduct" factor cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt with-
out a second trial.
F. Garrett and Future CCE Prosecutions
The holding in Garrett is that the Diaz exception to double jeopardy
included offense principles is applicable to a CCE. After a series of drug
offenses by a defendant, the government may prosecute any of the drug
offenses, and then reintroduce those offenses as predicate offenses of a
CCE, provided it alleges a continuation of the CCE after the earlier pros-
ecutions. This CCE prosecution may be brought regardless of whether
the government could have prosecuted the predicate offenses and the
CCE together in one trial.
Justice O'Connor's opinion offers an alternative approach for al-
lowing prosecution for a CCE after prosecutions for its predicate of-
fenses. Where a defendant continues to commit the greater offense, he
waives double jeopardy protection.225 This approach also permits prose-
cution for a CCE when the government alleges a continuation of the
CCE.
Both Justice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's approaches are fa-
cilitated by the flexibility in proof by which the government may show a
continuation of the CCE.226 Garrett makes it clear that a violation of the
drug laws is unnecessary to support an allegation that a defendant con-
tinued his CCE.227 Circumstantial evidence of varying degrees of proba-
225. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
227. The evidence of a continuation of criminal activities cited by the majority hardly
amounts to a drug offense. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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tive value will suffice to establish the continuation.228
Even if the government is unable to allege a continuation of the
CCE, dicta in Garrett indicates that the use of previously prosecuted
predicate offenses to establish a CCE may not be limited to the Diaz ex-
ception.229 Justice Rehnquist's included offense analysis would accom-
plish this result. If predicate offenses are not regarded as lesser-included
offenses, then no double jeopardy issue arises.23 Second, Justice
O'Connor indicated that to apply double jeopardy principles to the CCE
setting would "force the Government's hand" with respect to prosecu-
tion.21 This approach suggests that the governmental interest in prose-
cuting CCE's outweighs the defendant's interest in finality, even in the
absence of the defendant's criminal conduct after conviction for a predi-
cate offense. Given the weight of this interest, Justice O'Connor might
have rejected Garrett's appeal even if he had not continued his CCE.
Clearly, these approaches would place the CCE beyond the pale of suc-
cessive prosecution double jeopardy protection.
A defendant whose case presents a Garrett type situation finds him-
self in a double jeopardy straitjacket. When the government intends to
use previously prosecuted offenses to establish a CCE, the defendant will
only be able to circumvent Garrett by attacking the government's contin-
uation allegation. To make the Diaz exception inapplicable, a defendant
must argue that subsequently discovered evidence supporting a continua-
tion allegation will not be needed to successfully prosecute him for a
CCE.2 32 The irony of this argument is immediately apparent: The de-
fendant implicitly asserts that some evidence is sufficient to convict him
of a CCE. Furthermore, the only way to avoid Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis is to argue that the balance is unworkable in practice, because the
conduct factor is only capable of being weighed after the second trial.
However, this amounts to a complete rejection of Justice O'Connor's bal-
ancing test.
Conclusion
In Garrett, the Supreme Court effectively removed any successive
prosecution double jeopardy protection from CCE prosecutions that in-
228. Nothing discovered by the Government subsequent to the Washington conviction es-
tablished a violation of the drug laws as required by the CCE statute. See 21 U.S.C. 848 (b)
(1)-(2), supra note 35.
229. 105 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
230. The two offenses would be regarded as separate offenses under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
231. Garrett, 105 S. Ct. at 2422 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist also.voices
this concern: "We do not think that the Double Jeopardy Clause may be employed to force
the Government's hand.., however we were to resolve Garrett's lesser-included-offense argu-
ment." Id. at 2417.
232. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
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volve evidence of previous convictions as predicate offenses underlying
the CCE. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor provided a litany of reasons:
The included offense doctrine may be inapplicable to the CCE statute;
the Diaz exception to the included offense rule controls the facts in Gar-
rett; Garrett's claims must fail as a result of balancing double jeopardy
policies; and defendants may not use the Double Jeopardy Clause to
force the government's hand with regard to when to bring a CCE prose-
cution. Though the positions have fundamental weaknesses in derivation
and in application to Garrett, they unquestionably reflect the approach
the Rehnquist Court is likely to take when presented with future succes-
sive prosecution double jeopardy claims.
By Richard Finacom*
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1981; Member, third year class.
[Vol. 13:785
